In defence of existence questions by Daly, Chris & Liggins, David
Penultimate draft; final version published in The Monist 97.4 (2014), 460–478. 
IN DEFENCE OF EXISTENCE QUESTIONS 
Chris Daly and David Liggins, University of Manchester 
 
1 Introduction 
Do numbers exist? Do properties? Do possible worlds? Do fictional characters? Many 
metaphysicians spend time and effort trying to answer these and other questions about the 
existence of various entities. These inquiries have recently encountered opposition: a group of 
philosophers have argued that many or all of the existence questions debated by metaphysicians 
can be answered trivially, and so are not worth debating. Jonathan Schaffer argues that 
‘contemporary existence debates are trivial, in that the entities in question obviously do exist’ 
(Schaffer 2009: 357, his italics). Kit Fine (2009: 158–9) argues that, whilst the debate over the 
existence of concrete possible worlds may be non-trivial, this is an exceptional case: the existence 
questions debated by metaphysicians typically have trivial answers. Kathrin Koslicki (2012: 186) 
suggests that metaphysicians’ existence questions can often be answered trivially: for example, the 
correct answer to ‘Do numbers exist?’ is ‘Yes, of course’. 
Koslicki claims that a ‘significant reorientation’ of analytic metaphysics is taking place. She 
associates Quine with the attempt to answer existence questions, and claims that metaphysicians 
are moving away from Quinean metaphysics. In her view, they are moving towards an approach she 
associates with Aristotle, which emphasizes the importance of questions about dependence. Rather 
than investigating whether, for example, there are smiles, supporters of this approach investigate 
whether smiles depend on mouths. In the same spirit, Schaffer proposes that metaphysicians 
should concentrate on investigating what grounds what, describing this as a ‘more traditional 
Aristotelian view’ of metaphysics. Here Schaffer echoes earlier work of Fine’s (2001). Both Fine and 
Koslicki contribute chapters to a recent volume entitled Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics 
(Tahko ed. 2012). Let us therefore call Koslicki, Fine, and Schaffer ‘the neo-Aristotelians’. 
There is currently an explosion of work on dependence – especially non-causal dependence, or 
grounding, as it is often known.1 At the same time, many philosophers are sceptical about these 
inquiries, and some of this scepticism has been expressed in print.2 In this paper, we will stay 
neutral on whether questions about what grounds what are worthy of philosophical attention. Our 
task is to defend existence questions from the neo-Aristotelians’ attacks. 
                                                          
1 Clark and Liggins 2012 and Trogdon 2013 trace the developments. 
2 See Hofweber 2009 and Daly 2012. 
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Outside of philosophy, there are many non-trivial existence questions: for example, consider 
the controversies concerning the existence of Hitler’s diary, Higgs bosons, Iraqi weapons of mass 
destruction, cold fusion reactors, the Yeti, and extraterrestrial intelligence. We encounter many 
non-trivial existence questions in our everyday life: for instance, we might not know whether there 
exists a book in the library which addresses a certain problem, or whether, in this shop, there exists 
a suitable present for my aunt. We would therefore expect the same to go for philosophy, in that 
many of the existence questions debated within philosophy are non-trivial. Since the neo-
Aristotelians deny this, the burden of argument lies with them. 
In sections 2 and 3 we examine the neo-Aristotelians’ arguments and find them wanting. In 
section 4 we argue that Schaffer’s responses to objections are weak. In this way, we defend 
existence questions, and the philosophers who work on them, from their neo-Aristotelian critics. 
 
2 Post-Moorean modesty 
According to Schaffer, it is obvious that the entities in question exist. The existence of numbers is 
immediately entailed by something which is obviously true: that there are prime numbers. Similarly, 
Schaffer holds that the existence of properties follows from the ‘everyday truism’ (2009: 358) that 
there are properties you and I share. And so on for all of the entities whose existence is the subject 
of metaphysical debate. 
Schaffer responds to some objections which seek to show that these inferences are invalid. For 
the sake of argument, let us grant Schaffer their validity, and consider the prospects for replying to 
these arguments by denying the truisms in question. 
In Schaffer’s opinion, the truism that there are prime numbers ‘commands Moorean certainty, 
as being more credible than any philosopher’s argument to the contrary’ (2009: 357, his italics). 
Here Schaffer approvingly cites Fine: 
 
[I]n this age of post-Moorean modesty, many of us are inclined to doubt that philosophy is in 
possession of arguments that might genuinely serve to undermine what we ordinarily believe. 
It may perhaps be conceded that the arguments of the skeptic appear to be utterly compelling; 
but the Mooreans among us will hold that the very plausibility of our ordinary beliefs is reason 
enough for supposing that there must be something wrong in the skeptic’s arguments, even if 
we are unable to say what it is. (Fine 2001: 2) 
 
3 
As we have mentioned, Fine is more circumspect than Schaffer: Fine allows that the debate over 
the existence of concrete possible worlds may be non-trivial. Presumably that is because he thinks 
our ordinary beliefs neither entail that these entities exist nor entail that they do not exist. But Fine 
and Schaffer agree that many existence questions are easily answered by our ordinary beliefs. Their 
view is that, for many existence questions, there is some ordinary belief which (i) entails an answer 
to the question and (ii) which is more certain than the conjunction of the premises of any 
countervailing argument which a metaphysician might put forward. 
We will now argue that these considerations fail: appeal to post-Moorean modesty does not 
establish that a single contemporary existence debate concerns a trivially answerable question. 
What do Fine and Schaffer mean when they talk of truisms and ordinary beliefs being ‘credible’ 
and ‘plausible’? They cannot just mean that they are highly confident in ordinary beliefs, such as 
that there are prime numbers, or that there are properties that you and I share. That is because 
such psychological claims do not on their own establish anything epistemologically significant. The 
neo-Aristotelians are not merely reporting their own psychological states but claiming that the 
ordinary beliefs are exceptionally strongly justified – so strongly justified that no metaphysician 
could defeat them by argument. But it remains to be shown why we should think the beliefs have 
such a high degree of justification. 
To make the argument work, neo-Aristotelians need to show that the beliefs have this special 
epistemic status. What could establish that strong conclusion? Since the neo-Aristotelian view is 
intended to cover many or all of the existence questions debated by metaphysicians, they need to 
appeal to a general principle. The most obvious option is for them to appeal to some principle of 
epistemic conservatism, such as the principle that if you believe something, you are thereby 
justified in continuing to believe it. 
There are two problems with this option. First, the justification in question is defeasible. Faced 
with a strong argument against an ordinary belief, it would be dogmatic to insist on holding on to 
the belief on the ground that one already possesses it. Sufficiently strong evidence could overturn 
any ordinary belief. For instance, Aristotle and his contemporaries found it obvious that the Earth 
does not move, but their belief was refuted by the scientific evidence. It would have been absurd to 
reject the scientific arguments for earthly motion by asserting that their conclusion is obviously 
false. 
The second problem is that the principle of epistemic conservatism does not credit ordinary 
beliefs with a sufficiently high degree of justification. There are no arguments to show that if you 
believe something, you are thereby exceptionally strongly justified in continuing to believe it. But 
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the neo-Aristotelians’ argument requires that our ordinary beliefs are exceptionally strongly 
justified. 
So if the justification is not exceptionally strong, and is also defeasible, why think that 
metaphysicians cannot come up with strong enough evidence to defeat it? Earlier in his article, Fine 
rejects ‘the assumption that philosophy is able to provide us with some special reasons for doubting 
what we ordinarily accept’ (2001: 2), but he does not explain what he means by ‘special reasons’, or 
argue for this rejection other than in the passage quoted above. Similarly, Schaffer asserts that 
philosophers’ arguments lack credibility relative to Moorean certainties, as we have seen – but he 
does not explain what it is about philosophers’ arguments which given them this lowly status. 
We regard the allusion to Moore as misleading. Since Moore was arguing against murky 
Hegelian denials of the existence of the external world, the allusion suggests that metaphysicians 
deny ordinary beliefs on the basis of obscure and ill-motivated doctrines. Whilst some 
metaphysicians may argue that way, it is clear that they do not all do. Metaphysicians appeal to the 
same sorts of premises as other philosophers. Quite generally, the best arguments start from 
plausible premises. Neither do metaphysicians employ any unfamiliar or esoteric forms of inference. 
Fine is therefore right to deny that philosophy provides special reasons for doubting ordinary 
beliefs. Ordinary reasons suffice. Neither Fine nor Schaffer has offered an argument to show that 
philosophers cannot supply ordinary reasons. 
Many philosophers think of reflective equilibrium as the correct philosophical method. (DePaul 
1998 argues that it is the only rational philosophical method.) In reflective equilibrium we try to 
turn our stock of beliefs into as theoretically virtuous a collection as possible. This may well involve 
adding further beliefs, but equally it might involve discarding some beliefs in order to make the 
collection more virtuous, all things considered. Even if we count conservatism as a virtue – that is, 
even if we think that a collection which preserves pre-theoretical beliefs as more virtuous thereby – 
it may be that the collection which is most virtuous overall is one which is not especially 
conservative. That is because there are virtues other than conservatism which a philosophical 
theory may possess (consistency, simplicity, explanatory power, etc.) and all virtues must be taken 
into account when a collection is assessed. On a reflective equilibrium approach to philosophy, it is 
not guaranteed that the best collection will incorporate most of our pre-theoretical beliefs. Still less 
is it guaranteed that it will incorporate all of them. As Lewis writes, expounding reflective 
equilibrium: ‘Sometimes common sense may properly be corrected, when the earned credence that 
is gained by making theory more systematic more than makes up for the inherited credence that is 
lost’ (1986: 134) (see also Quine 1981: 72 and Daly and Liggins 2010: section 4). 
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This discussion makes it clear how a philosophical argument may overturn an ordinary belief 
without citing any distinctively philosophical reason for denying it. The argument may simply cite 
the ordinary sort of reason: that its denial is part of the theory which is most virtuous overall. 
Let us illustrate the point. According to Schaffer (2009: 357 n. 8), philosophical arguments 
against the existence of numbers ‘typically involve substantive causal and/or epistemic theses, 
aimed to show that entities like numbers would have to be causally inert or epistemically 
inaccessible’. Schaffer goes on to claim that ‘mathematical truisms such as [‘There are prime 
numbers’] deserve far greater credence than any causal and/or epistemic philosophical dictums 
they may conflict with’. Schaffer has in mind here arguments such as the following: 
 
If numbers exist, then we have arithmetical knowledge. 
We have arithmetical knowledge only if we are causally related to numbers. 
We are not causally related to numbers. 
Therefore, numbers do not exist. 
 
(Benacerraf 1973: section IV puts forward an argument of this sort.) The second premise of the 
argument places a causal constraint on arithmetical knowledge. Since this premise is less obvious 
than the conclusion, it may be that the argument is best regarded as a reductio of the premise (see 
Lewis 1986: 108–9). 
For convenience, we will grant that the arguments Schaffer regards as typical really are so. 
Since Schaffer’s conclusion is that there is no good philosophical argument against the existence of 
numbers, it is insufficient for him to discuss only the typical arguments against their existence – for 
perhaps the non-typical arguments are successful. We will now present an argument against the 
existence of numbers and show that it escapes Schaffer’s objection. The argument is based on Field 
(1989: 25–30, 68–9, 230–9). 
 
If there are numbers, then mathematicians have many true mathematical beliefs about them. 
But if so, then how is the accuracy of these beliefs to be explained? The challenge is hard to 
meet: since numbers are not causally active, there is no causal explanation; but no adequate 
non-causal explanation is available either. If we deny that there are numbers, we avoid this 
explanatory deficit. Indeed, this improvement in explanatory power outweighs the diminished 
conservativeness, so by denying the existence of numbers we make our theory more virtuous 
overall. 
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This argument avoids any general claim about the relation between causation and knowledge. It 
contains no philosophical ‘dictum’ corresponding to the second premise of the previous argument. 
As a consequence, it escapes Schaffer’s objection.3 
The argument illustrates the point we made earlier: it does not offer any special philosophical 
reasons for doubting the existence of numbers, but only an ordinary sort of reason – that, all things 
considered, our account of the world will be superior if we deny that there are numbers. The 
argument does assume that considerations of explanatory power can outweigh considerations of 
conservatism, but then we have never been supplied with an argument to disprove this.4 
Venting his post-Moorean modesty, Fine writes: ‘in so far … as the pretensions of philosophy to 
provide a world-view rest upon its claim to be in possession of the epistemological high ground, 
those pretensions had better be given up’ (Fine 2001: 2). We regard Fine’s talk of ‘pretentions’ and 
‘high ground’ as unhelpfully rhetorical. More importantly, Fine’s claim is misplaced, given that his 
principal target, and that of the other neo-Aristotelians, is Quine. For Quine famously denies that 
philosophy occupies ‘the epistemological high ground’: he characterizes philosophy as ‘not as an a 
priori propaedeutic or groundwork for science’ but ‘continuous with science’. According to Quine, 
‘There is no external vantage point, no first philosophy’ (Quine 1969: 126–7). Fine thus 
mischaracterises his leading opponent’s position, and this leads to a failure to engage with the 
holistic epistemology Quine actually proposed. We have shown that metaphysicians who work on 
existence questions can disavow any claim to the epistemological ‘high ground’ whilst reserving the 
right to deny ordinary beliefs and everyday truisms. 
 
3 Interdisciplinary deference 
As we have seen, Schaffer says that the claim that there are prime numbers ‘commands Moorean 
certainty’. But he also describes the claim as a ‘mathematical truism’ (2009: 357). Similarly, Schaffer 
describes the claim that my body has proper parts (hands, for example) as a ‘biological banality’, 
and goes on to argue that it is clear that there exist things with proper parts (2009: 358). These 
descriptions hint at a different way to argue for the triviality of contemporary existence debates. 
The idea is that some or all of these debates can be settled by appeal to our best theories from 
other disciplines, such as mathematics or biology: these debates are trivial, since our best theories 
in these areas entail the existence of the relevant entities. Fine echoes this idea when he claims 
                                                          
3 See also Liggins 2006 and and Liggins 2010: 70–5. 
4 For a critical survey of philosophical arguments against ordinary beliefs, see Daly and Liggins 2010. 
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that the question of whether there are numbers is ‘a mathematical question … that is to be settled 
on the basis of purely mathematical considerations’, and says that scientists have the job of settling 
whether there are atoms (2009: 169). 
Many philosophers would agree that appeal to mathematics provides a strong case for the 
existence of numbers. But that does not show that the debate over the existence of numbers is 
trivial – for perhaps there is a strong case against the existence of numbers. And the same goes for 
appeal to biology and other disciplines to settle existence questions. To establish that an existence 
debate is trivial in this fashion, it must be that the theory from outside philosophy provides so 
strong a case for a particular answer to the existence question that it cannot be defeated by any 
other considerations to which a philosopher might appeal. Above we examined the suggestion that 
ordinary beliefs cannot be overturned by philosophical arguments; now we must examine the 
suggestion that results from other disciplines cannot be overturned by philosophical arguments. 
The first thing to note about the suggestion is that it is implausible. Let us confine our attention 
for the time being to mathematics and the natural sciences. We all agree that these disciplines are 
of immense value, that they are among our proudest intellectual achievements, and they deserve a 
large measure of respect. But none of those platitudes entails that these disciplines provide reasons 
for belief which are philosophically indefeasible. That is a much stronger claim: it goes beyond 
respect for these disciplines, and substitutes unquestioning deference. Those who make that 
stronger claim owe us an argument for it. 
There is a second reason to think that the suggestion is implausible. It implies that 
philosophical reflection cannot help us to correct our best theories from other areas. But it is a 
platitude that careful reflection on a group of beliefs can help to improve them. Proponents of the 
suggestion are committed to the striking view that less thinking is better, so far as discovering the 
truth is concerned. Perhaps they think that there is a special problem with the sort of philosophical 
reflection practiced by metaphysicians. If so, then we can only repeat the remarks made in the 
previous section. Perhaps they think that those who reject the suggestion have to make the 
hubristic claim that some philosophers are better at mathematics than mathematicians, or better at 
biology than biologists. If so, then we can only point out that this does not follow, since to engage 
in philosophical reflection is not to engage in mathematics or biology. 
Since the suggestion is implausible, the burden of proof rests on those who make it: only if 
there is a compelling argument in its favour should we endorse the suggestion. But no such 
argument has been given. 
8 
Schaffer (2009: 357 n. 8) cites David Lewis’s comment that he is ‘moved to laughter at the 
thought of how presumptuous it would be to reject mathematics for philosophical reasons’ (Lewis 
1991: 59). The passage from which this comment is drawn is the one most often cited by 
philosophers seeking to justify deference to mathematics. Although Lewis (1991: 59) claims not to 
be offering an argument, his remarks certainly suggest an argument in support of Schaffer’s 
attitude: 
 
How would you like the job of telling the mathematicians that they must change their ways, 
and abjure countless errors, now that philosophy has discovered that there are no classes? Can 
you tell them, with a straight face, to follow philosophical argument wherever it may lead? If 
they challenge your credentials, will you boast of philosophy’s other great discoveries: that 
motion is impossible, that a being than which no greater can be conceived cannot be conceived 
not to exist, that it is unthinkable that anything exists outside the mind, that time is unreal, that 
no theory has ever been made at all probable by evidence (but on the other hand that an 
empirically ideal theory cannot possibly be false), that it is a wide-open scientific question 
whether anyone has ever believed anything, and so on, and on ad nauseam? Not me! (Lewis 
1991: 59) 
 
The argument proceeds by comparing the track records of mathematics and philosophy. The 
comparison is supposed to establish that mathematics has a better track record than philosophy. 
Does Lewis’s litany of heroic philosophical failures establish that it would be presumptuous, or 
otherwise bad, for philosophers to deny our best mathematical theories? 
We do not think it does. The Lewisian argument has been subjected to careful discussion in the 
subsequent literature, and the consensus is that the argument fails. Here we will summarize two of 
the most significant complaints. 
The first objection is that the argument is a crude induction. Perhaps philosophy as a whole has 
a bad track record. But that does not imply that every part of philosophy has a bad track record. 
Philosophy’s heroic failures were the results of bad arguments. If we can identify what made those 
arguments bad, and show that metaphysicians’ arguments do not share these defects, then we can 
defend these philosophers’ work from the Lewisian argument. For instance, take Popper’s 
argument that no amount of evidence can make an unfalsified theory probable. If I reject the 
standards of argument which Popper relied on in reaching this conclusion, and thereby reject some 
of Popper’s premises or inferential moves – then, as Paseau 2008: section 4.5 puts it, ‘the fact that 
9 
his then philosophy of science is from my point of view manifestly wrong does nothing to shake my 
faith in my own philosophical standards’. Even if the track record of philosophy has a whole is 
inferior to the track record of biology or mathematics, that does not imply that contemporary 
metaphysicians’ arguments are inferior to the arguments of contemporary biologists or 
mathematicians. It remains to be shown that the arguments of contemporary metaphysicians share 
the defects which led Popper and others into error.5 
Moreover, it is unclear that disciplines such as mathematics and biology have a better track 
record than philosophy when it comes to answering the existence questions debated by 
metaphysicians. Typically mathematicians and scientists presuppose some philosophically 
controversial existence claims, which are reflected in the theories they come up with. Schaffer’s 
examples will serve here: mathematicians and mathematical theories presuppose that there are 
numbers; biologists and biological theories presuppose that there are parts. Now mathematicians 
do not spend any time addressing the question of whether there are numbers, any more than 
biologists spend time discussing the questions of whether there are parts. There are no 
mathematical arguments for the existence of numbers: that there are numbers is an assumption of 
mathematics, not one of its conclusions. Anyone who scours mathematics textbooks for a proof of 
the existence of numbers is bound to be disappointed.6 (That is why it is misleading for Fine to 
describe the question of whether there are numbers as ‘to be settled on the basis of purely 
mathematical considerations’.) Few mathematicians or scientists are familiar with the philosophical 
debates concerning these matters, and even fewer have been trained to contribute to these 
debates. On the other hand, their theories may have been influenced by philosophical theories 
which philosophers now reject. For instance, quantum mechanics may reflect instrumentalism in 
the philosophy of science, which is now unpopular (see Lewis 1987: xi and Dorr 2010: 160–1). So 
when we focus on the existence questions debated by metaphysicians, it is far from clear that we 
should regard mathematics or science as having a superior track record to philosophy. 
In the words of Mark Balaguer: 
 
In short, there are not many mathematicians who have very much expertise on these issues, 
and so it seems to me that there is nothing immodest, to use Burgess’s term, about 
                                                          
5 See also Paseau 2005 and Daly and Liggins 2011: 326. 
6 ‘But didn’t Euclid prove that there are infinitely many primes?’ No: he proved a conditional – that, if there 
exist prime numbers, there exist infinitely many of them. By the same reckoning, earlier mathematicians had 
proved only that, if there are numbers, there are prime numbers. No mathematician has proved that there 
are numbers. 
10 
philosophers telling mathematicians what they ought to say about these issues. Indeed, just 
the opposite seems true, for it is philosophers who are the experts here. They are the ones who 
have been trained to address questions like this and who focus on these questions 
professionally. (2009: 155; see also Dorr 2010: 151–2) 
 
We maintain that precisely the same goes for empirical scientists such as biologists. Their training 
fits them to answer biological questions, not metaphysical ones. Those who are immodest are not 
the metaphysicians who debate answers to existence questions, but those philosophers who 
suppose that these debates can be settled merely by citing what mathematical or scientists say. For 
it is immodest to claim that that is the one and only consideration relevant to the debate. 
Now if a scientific theory’s empirical failure could ever be traced to false metaphysical 
assumptions, then scientists would be in a position to deny these assumptions. But the existence 
questions debated by metaphysicians are seldom directly empirically testable in this way, and it is 
controversial whether they are empirically testable in any way. So we should expect that 
metaphysical assumptions will remain part of scientific theories regardless of whether these 
assumptions are true or false.7 
The first objection, then, is that once we focus on the specific questions at issue, and on the 
specific community of philosophers labouring to answer them, the Lewisian argument is revealed to 
be a crude induction. 
The second objection is simpler: the argument threatens to prove too much. The Lewisian 
argument is not meant to cast doubt on philosophy as a whole, but only on those philosophical 
claims which conflict with results from other disciplines. But the argument, if successful, does show 
that philosophy as a whole cannot establish any conclusions. It is an attempt to discredit the 
reliability of philosophical arguments in general. So the argument as it stands proves too much. The 
defender of the argument needs to persuade us of the (implausible) claim that philosophy is 
dubious only when its results conflict with mathematics or science.8 
It is notable that, although Schaffer cites Lewis with approval, he does not discuss these or any 
of the other objections that have been levelled at the Lewisian argument. 
Although the Lewisian argument is the principal argument that has been offered in support of 
the claim that results from other disciplines cannot be overturned by philosophical arguments, 
some other arguments have been made as well. For instance, one might appeal to the fact that 
                                                          
7 For a case study, see Daly and Liggins 2013. 
8 See Leng 2005: 282 and Daly and Liggins 2011: 327–8. 
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there is much more agreement among mathematicians and scientists than among philosophers. We 
lack the space to discuss these here but refer the reader to the criticisms of these arguments made 
in Paseau 2008: section 4, and Daly and Liggins 2011. 
So far we have argued that it is implausible that the results from other disciplines cannot be 
overturned by philosophical arguments, and we have suggested that there is no compelling 
argument for this conclusion. To finish this section, we will present an unsolved problem for the 
view. 
The problem concerns the basis on which disciplines are singled out for the extreme degree of 
respect which Schaffer proposes. What is it about astrology and biology that makes it permissible 
for philosophers to contradict the former but not the latter (Rosen 1999; Rosen 2001: 81-2)? 
Penelope Maddy (1997: 184) has tried to answer this question by claiming that ‘successful’ 
disciplines are immune from philosophical criticism. But what is ‘success’ here? If Maddy means 
‘success by the discipline’s own standards’, then any discipline, no matter how dubious, could 
render itself immune from philosophical criticism by lowering its standards until it counts itself as 
successful – and that would be absurd. But it is hard to find another conception of success which 
will serve Maddy’s purpose.9 To the best of our knowledge, the questions of which disciplines 
deserve this degree of respect, and why, have never received adequate answers. 
To summarize: the claim that debates over existence questions are settled by ‘mathematical 
truisms’ and ‘biological banalities’ is implausible, lacks a secure motivation, and raises a difficult 
unsolved problem. 
 
4 Schaffer’s replies 
So far we have argued that the triviality of the existence questions debated by metaphysicians has 
not been established by appeal to post-Moorean modesty, nor by appeal to interdisciplinary 
deference. In this section we argue that Schaffer’s responses to objections are weak. 
The dispensability argument. Schaffer (2009: 360) considers the objection that there are ways 
of eliminating entities from our best theories. For instance, Field 1980 offers a way of removing 
reference to mathematical entities from scientific theories. Perhaps Field’s reformulated theories 
are superior to the originals, in which case the motivation for claiming that numbers exist is 
diminished, and so the existence of numbers is not so trivial after all. 
                                                          
9 See Paseau 2008: sections 4.3 and 5.2 and Daly and Liggins 2011: 336. 
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Schaffer’s reply to this objection is to distinguish proposals such as Field’s from the ‘Quinean 
gloss’ they might be given. Schaffer maintains that if Field’s reformulation succeeds, then it shows 
‘how numbers do exist in a world of concrete substances, as grounded in certain features of such 
substances’, such as relations between spacetime points. He claims that this interpretation of 
Field’s work is superior to the rival interpretation on which it contributes to the debate over the 
existence of numbers, because it renders Field’s reformulation consistent with the ‘obvious fact’ 
that there are prime numbers (2009: 360). 
It is very difficult to make sense of the interpretation Schaffer is proposing. Field’s 
reformulations of scientific theories make no mention of numbers or grounding, so it is hard to see 
how they ‘show’ (Schaffer’s word) that numbers are grounded in the concrete. The reformulated 
theories do not have the right form to be interpreted as theories about the grounding of numbers. 
According to Schaffer, ‘The question for those who would want to retain the eliminativist construal 
of such constructions is why?’ (2009: 360 n. 14, Schaffer’s italics). The question for them to ask 
Schaffer is what is the proposed alternative? 
We wonder whether Schaffer would say the same in other cases where entities are apparently 
eliminated from theories. The discovery that the best explanation of combustion does not imply the 
existence of phlogiston is generally taken to show that phlogiston does not exist. Would Schaffer 
say that it established that phlogiston does exist after all, grounded in other things? Copernican 
astronomy was supposed to avoid the Ptolematic postulation of epicycles. Would Schaffer say that 
Copernican astronomy actually vindicates the existence of epicycles and tells us about their 
grounds? Would he claim that naturalistic explanations of apparent miracles in fact support the 
existence of the supernatural? We do not think that these suggestions are plausible, and we fail to 
see why the case of Field’s programme is any different. 
As part of a response to this criticism, Schaffer might claim the following epistemic difference: 
the existence of numbers is obvious, whereas empirical inquiry has revealed that there is no reason 
to believe in the existence of phlogiston and epicycles. But Schaffer cannot take this route. By his 
lights, the existence of failed posits follows immediately from the banal observation that some 
failed posits are difficult to detect. Schaffer’s other commitments require him to believe in 
phlogiston and epicycles. Given what he says about God – that God exists and is a fictional 
character (2009: 359) – we would expect Schaffer to say that the scientific question about 
phlogiston and epicyles is not whether they exist, but whether they are fictional. So Schaffer cannot 
respond to our objection by citing the epistemic difference mentioned above. 
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Fine’s response to dispensability arguments is along these lines: he maintains that we have 
reasons to believe in mathematical objects which have nothing to do with their role in explanation. 
‘[T]he fact that there are no goblins is reason enough to think that the number of goblins is 0 (and 
hence that there is a number)’ (Fine 2009: 160). Here Fine seems to appeal to the neo-Fregean 
philosophy of mathematics associated with Neil Tennant, Crispin Wright, and Bob Hale. The neo-
Fregean view is highly controversial, and that is enough to undercut Fine’s contention that the 
existence of numbers is a trivial matter.10 
Intuitions of unreality. According to Schaffer, it is trivial that fictional characters exist: it follows 
from the ‘literary fact’ that Conan Doyle created Sherlock Holmes. Schaffer acknowledges that we 
have, as he puts it, ‘countervailing intuitions of unreality’: it is natural to say that Sherlock Holmes 
does not exist (Schaffer 2009: 359, 360). 
Schaffer attempts to accommodate these intuitions by invoking the familiar phenomenon of 
quantifier domain restriction. When I say ‘Everything is in the picnic basket’, I do not make the 
absurd claim that everything whatsoever is in the basket. Rather, the context narrows down the 
domain of my utterance, for instance, to those things that are required for the picnic, so that I claim 
that everything needed for the picnic is in the basket. Schaffer does not spell out his suggestion in 
detail: in particular, he does not mention which restriction he thinks is operative when we claim 
‘Holmes does not exist’. There are various possible alternatives: if we restrict the domain to the 
entities that are not fictional characters, for instance, or the entities that are mind-independent, 
then plausibly ‘Holmes does not exist’ will come out as true, even if – unrestrictedly speaking – 
Holmes does exist. 
The same defence has been tried by other philosophers who hold that fictional characters exist, 
including Amie Thomasson and Alberto Voltolini. But it is subject to a powerful objection, due to 
Kendall Walton (2003: 240–1) and Anthony Everett (2007: 67). Their point is that there is a subtle 
difference between claims of the form ‘There are Fs’ and claims of the form ‘Fs exist’: the former 
are subject to quantifier domain restriction, but the latter are not. For instance, suppose I inspect 
the contents of my garage and discover there is no bicycle there. Then it is appropriate to say 
‘There is no bicycle’, but inappropriate to say ‘Bicycles do not exist’. In the circumstances, the 
former has a true reading on which it claims that there is no bicycle in the garage. But ‘Bicycles do 
not exist’ does not have a true reading in these circumstances. (If you deny the existence of bicycles, 
please change the example.) The same goes for names: if N exists outside the domain of 
                                                          
10 Wright and Hale (2001: 421–36) list eighteen outstanding problems; MacBride 2003 surveys the many 
critical responses to neo-Fregeanism. See also Ebert and Rossberg (forthcoming). 
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quantification, it is inappropriate to say ‘N does not exist’. The consequences are clear: while ‘There 
is no such thing as Holmes’ might be an example of quantifier domain restriction, ‘Holmes does not 
exist’ is not – and so Schaffer cannot defend his theory by appeal to that phenomenon. Schaffer 
does not discuss this objection.11 
Contradicting the dicta. Schaffer (2009: 361) considers the further objection that his view 
violates ‘some crucial methodological, epistemological, or metaphysical dictum’. The 
methodological dictum he discusses is Occam’s Razor. Schaffer admits that his ontology is 
extremely abundant but maintains that it does not fall foul of this dictum. His defence is that the 
Razor should be understood to concern just those entities which do not have a ground. Following 
Schaffer, let us call these ‘fundamental’ entities. In Schaffer’s view, we should minimize the number 
of fundamental entities, but it does not matter how many non-fundamental entities we posit; since 
Schaffer does not claim that there is an abundance of fundamental entities, he takes it that his view 
escapes the Razor. 
Schaffer then considers two objections together: that his postulation of entities we cannot 
experience offends against ‘empiricist scruples’; and that his postulation of abstract entities 
contradicts ‘nominalistic demands’. Here his strategy is to argue that his view can accommodate 
the scruples and demands in question. Let us quote the whole of his reply: 
 
Empiricist scruples and nominalistic demands may be met if the entities in question are 
grounded. For instance, if numbers are indeed grounded in the concrete realm, then (i) they 
may be known via their concrete grounds, and (ii) they would be brought down to earth. 
(Schaffer 2009: 361) 
 
Schaffer’s replies to these objections all involve the notion of grounding. For the sake of 
argument, we will grant that grounding-talk is intelligible. Even making this concession, we regard 
Schaffer’s replies as weak, for reasons we will now explain. 
In the case of Occam’s Razor, Schaffer admits that his view runs into trouble with the principle 
as it is usually formulated, and goes on to reformulate it to avoid the trouble. Since we are supplied 
with no further argument, this modification is an ad hoc manoeuvre. We are given no reason at all 
to doubt the usual formulation of Occam’s Razor, and so no reason to think that Schaffer’s view is 
                                                          
11
 Everett 2007 presents objections to other proposals for accommodating the intuitions, short of denying 
the existence of fictional characters, and argues that the evidence favours a theory according to which there 
are no fictional characters. 
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out of trouble. Admittedly, Schaffer links his view to previous debate by quoting Armstrong’s 
phrase ‘the ontological free lunch’, but it is far from clear that Armstrong has established Schaffer’s 
favoured version of the Razor.12 
In section 2, we encountered Field’s epistemological argument against the existence of abstract 
entities. Schaffer’s reply to such worries about the abstract entities he posits amounts to the 
suggestion that we know about these entities known via the concrete entities which ground them. 
As it stands, this suggestion is not substantial enough to be successful. To begin with, it raises the 
question: which concrete entities ground the numbers? Schaffer does not tell us, so it is difficult for 
us to accept that these entities, whatever they are, serve as the source of our arithmetical 
knowledge. Schaffer does say (2009: 375) that each singleton set is grounded by its member, so 
probably he thinks that we can gain knowledge of a singleton – for instance, the knowledge that 
Helen’s singleton exists – by coming to know about its member – Helen, in this case. But we are 
given no hint of how knowing about Helen would help us discover that there is a set of which she is 
the sole member. 
Moreover, the suggestion is implausible, for in other cases it seems that grounding lacks the 
epistemological implications Schaffer needs. General doubts about grounding aside, it is plausible 
that cases of realization are cases of grounding: for instance, it may be that our mental states are 
grounded in the neurophysiological states of our brains. But we cannot come to know what mental 
state someone is in merely by knowing what neurophysiological state their brain is in. We cannot 
come to know of correlations between mental and neurophysiological states merely by knowing 
the neurophysiological states: independent access to the mental states is required (Williamson 
1994: 204). In this case, knowing the ground is insufficient for knowing the grounded. Now perhaps 
there are other cases where knowing the ground suffices for knowing the grounded, but Schaffer 
needs to establish that, and show that knowledge of abstract entities conforms to this pattern. 
Schaffer’s brief proposal is tantalizing, but it is very far from constituting an acceptable 
epistemology of the abstract. 
Finally, Schaffer’s response to ‘nominalistic demands’ is to say that providing grounds for 
abstract entities ‘brings them down to earth’. We are unsure what Schaffer has in mind here. If the 
nominalistic demand is ‘Do not posit abstract entities’, then the postulation of abstract entities that 
are grounded clearly fails to meet the demand. Perhaps Schaffer intends to treat this worry in a 
similar way to the Occam’s Razor objection: he might assert that there is no need to meet the 
                                                          
12 See David 2005: section 3 for commentary on the ‘ontological free lunch’. For further criticism of Schaffer 
on Occam’s Razor, see Daly 2010: 97–8 and Clark 2012: section 4.4. 
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demand ‘Do not posit abstract entities’, and that his theory meets the more reasonable demand 
‘Do not posit ungrounded abstract entities’. But then the same worry arises as before: until we are 
given a reason to think that the first demand is unreasonable, the assertion establishes nothing. 
Many philosophers who deny the existence of abstract entities will back up their denial by citing 
Occamist or epistemological objections; and we have already argued that Schaffer’s attempts to 
overcome these objections are unsuccessful. 
 
5 Conclusion 
We have argued that the neo-Aristotelians’ arguments for the triviality of existence questions are 
unpersuasive, and we have argued that Schaffer’s replies to objections are weak. Perhaps the neo-
Aristotelians are right to commend the study of grounding – on that issue, we have remained 
neutral. But they are wrong to deprecate ontology as the study of trivial questions.13 
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